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Abstract
Productivity risk is pervasive in underdeveloped countries. This paper highlights a way in which
underdevelopment exacerbates productivity risk. Productivity shocks cause larger changes in the
wage when workers are poorer, less able to migrate, and more credit-constrained because of such
workers’ inelastic labor supply. This equilibrium wage eﬀect hurts workers. In contrast, it acts as
insurance for landowners. Agricultural wage data for 257 districts in India for 1956-87 are used
to test the predictions, with rainfall as an instrument for agricultural productivity. In districts
with fewer banks or higher migration costs, the wage is much more responsive to ﬂuctuations in
productivity.
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1I. Introduction
Most of the world’s poor work in agriculture, a livelihood prone to large swings in productivity,
caused for example by drought. An extensive literature has shown the severe welfare consequences
of droughts and other productivity shocks in developing countries. Malnutrition increases, children
drop out of school, and farmers sell down their productive assets, depressing their income in future
years.1 These eﬀects occur in response to the sharp drop in earning power that agricultural workers
experience during bad crop seasons. For example, in Bangladesh the real agricultural wage fell by
50% during the 1974 drought year, and over a more typical period from 1976 to 1984, the coeﬃcient
of variation of the annual real wage was 9% (Ravallion 1987, Osmani 1995).2 Even extreme famines
are generally regarded as due more to income loss than to food scarcity. The ﬁrst famine report for
India concluded that India experiences “rather famines of work than of food,” (Srivastava 1968).
This paper highlights and examines empirically a way in which underdevelopment itself exacer-
bates productivity risk for the poor. Speciﬁcally, a productivity shock translates into a larger change
in the wage if workers are closer to subsistence, less able to migrate, and more credit constrained
because such workers supply labor less elastically. Consider an economy in which individuals are
able to save or borrow. When agricultural labor productivity is low—for example when bad weather
has lowered the crop yield, reducing the demand for labor at harvest time—individuals will supply
less labor and instead borrow or draw upon savings to smooth their consumption. In contrast, in an
economy with limited ﬁnancial services, workers will cut back their labor supply by less or might in
fact work more in order to meet their consumption needs. For a given negative shock to total factor
productivity (TFP), the equilibrium wage is lower in the second economy. The consequence for a
worker is that he is exposed to more wage volatility in an economy with a less developed ﬁnancial
sector. Because of this pecuniary externality, a worker who cannot smooth consumption is better oﬀ
if other workers can.
The labor supply response to a change in the wage has two oﬀsetting eﬀects. If the wage falls, an
income eﬀect leads workers to supply more labor and a substitution eﬀect leads them to shift away
from labor. When the the income eﬀect is strong and the substitution eﬀect is weak, individuals’
labor supply responses will do little to cushion the aggregate impact of a shock. Underdeveloped
areas have just this feature. The inability to save or borrow leads to a stronger income eﬀect, as
described above. Poverty also heightens the income eﬀect. Being able to consume more is especially
valuable to someone near subsistence, so his marginal utility of income is high. Another factor is
1See Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993), Dreze (1995), Jacoby and Skouﬁas (1997), Jensen (2000), among others.
2The coeﬃcient of variation is 9% for either the wage or the wage residual when a linear trend has been removed.
2whether workers are able to substitute toward other labor markets. Agricultural shocks are typically
local to an area, so labor supply in an area will be more elastic when workers can migrate between
areas more easily.
The general equilibrium wage eﬀects caused by inelastic labor supply have important distributional
implications. When productivity shocks cause larger ﬂuctuations in the wage, the poor are made worse
oﬀ because the labor income which they rely upon becomes more volatile. For the land-owning rich,
in contrast, wage ﬂuctuations act as insurance. A negative shock to TFP reduces the proﬁts earned
from land, but the lower the wage a landowner must pay in lean times, the less proﬁts are hurt.
Proﬁts are also less responsive to positive shocks when labor is supplied inelastically, but a risk averse
landowner is better oﬀ on net when good and bad proﬁt swings are dampened. Moreover, since a
landowner’s proﬁt function is convex in the wage (an input price), increased wage variance raises
average proﬁts. Because of these equilibrium wage eﬀects, measures that enable the poor to better
respond to risk, such as better access to ﬁnancial services, may hurt landowners.
To develop these ideas, the paper models an agrarian economy in which individuals vary in the
amount of land they own, and the equilibrium wage is determined by individual labor supply and
demand decisions. The model demonstrates how the responsiveness of the equilibrium wage to TFP
shocks varies with workers’ ability to smooth consumption, and how this diﬀerentially aﬀects the
welfare of wealthier versus poorer individuals.
The paper tests the predictions using data on 257 districts in India from 1956 to 1987. Data on
the agricultural wage and crop yield are used to estimate the elasticity of the wage with respect to
TFP and then to test whether the wage elasticity is larger in areas that are less developed. To isolate
exogenous changes in agricultural productivity, local rainfall is used as an instrumental variable. The
results suggest that the wage responds much diﬀerently to TFP shocks depending on the availability
of smoothing mechanisms. First, the wage is less sensitive to productivity shocks if an area has better
opportunities for shifting income intertemporally, that is, if the banking sector is more developed.
Second, access to other areas, which enables workers to substitute away from the home labor market,
leads to large reductions in wage variability. Compared to the sample mean, a standard deviation
increase in railway access reduces the wage elasticity by more than 50%. Third, and perhaps most
surprisingly, landlessness among agricultural workers decreases the responsiveness of the wage to TFP.
One explanation supported by the data is that the landless migrate in response to negative shocks
more readily than landowners who are tied to their land.
Several papers have found that individual labor supply is inelastic in poor countries, sometimes
3even downward-sloping in the wage.3 This paper builds on the literature by considering the aggregate
eﬀect of such behavior—the fact that when workers “sell labor low,” the wage becomes more sensitive
to ﬂuctuations in TFP. Figure 1 provides suggestive cross-country evidence consistent with this general
equilibrium eﬀect. The ﬁgure plots the magnitude of year-to-year ﬂuctuations in the agricultural
wage versus gross domestic product, using Occupational Wages of the World data (Freeman and
Oostendorp 2000). Poorer countries seem to experience considerably more agricultural wage volatility
than richer ones.4 This paper oﬀers an explanation for this fact based on individual behavior and
price theory. While more time-series wage variance is consistent with the wage responding more to
productivity shocks in poor countries, the pattern in Figure 1 could just be driven by poor countries
having noisier wage data or larger agricultural productivity shocks. Hence, the approach of this paper
is to examine not just wage variance but more precisely changes in the wage caused by changes in
TFP. Moreover, using a unique panel data set, the paper employs microeconometric techniques that
isolate exogenous TFP shocks.
The paper is also related to a large literature on income risk in developing countries. A main focus
of previous work is informal village insurance, or the extent to which a community pools idiosyncratic
risk.5 One conclusion in the literature is that closed environments may be advantageous, for example
because self-enforcing contracts are more sustainable when the cost of absconding is high. Townsend
(1995) ﬁnds unusually little informal insurance in one of the Thai villages he studies and speculates
that its location by a major highway may have caused the village support system to deteriorate.
This paper, in contrast, emphasizes locally aggregate risk—when a village suﬀers a drought, by and
large, all suﬀer in lockstep—which does not lend itself to village coinsurance. Openness could help
alleviate this type of risk. For example, labor force mobility dampens the eﬀects of shocks if workers
in low-productivity areas migrate to higher-productivity areas. Moreover, it may be the poor who
especially beneﬁt from this type of market integration.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II models an agrarian economy
subject to productivity shocks, and section III presents the theoretical results. Section IV describes
the empirical strategy and data used to test the predictions. The empirical results are presented in
3See Rosenzweig (1980), Lamb (1996), and Rose (2001) for evidence on rural India, Sharif (1991) on Bangladesh,
and Frankenberg, Smith, and Thomas (2003) on Indonesia. Note that I use inelastic to mean that the elasticity is low,
not small in magnitude.
4The real business cycle literature provides further evidence that the wage is more responsive to shocks in poor
countries. In the ﬁve developing countries studied by Agenor, McDermott, and Prasad (2000), the correlation between
the quarterly real wage and contemporaneous domestic output ranges from .31 to .68 for 1978-95. The correlation
coeﬃcient in the U.S. is about .12 (King and Rebelo 1999).
5See, for example, Townsend (1994), Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997), Deaton (1997), Morduch (2001) and Attanasio
and Rios-Rull (2000).
4section V. Section VI presents conclusions.
II. Model of an Agrarian Labor Market with Productivity Shocks
This section models a rural agricultural economy subject to productivity shocks. Villagers choose
their labor supply, landowning villagers choose their labor demand, and the labor market clears. The
purpose of the model is to characterize equilibrium wage eﬀects in a setting where workers are reliant
on their labor income. Then in section III comparative statics are derived and the model is extended
to include migration.
A. Assumptions
The economy (village) has a large number N of agents who live for two periods (t = 1,2). Each
agent i is endowed with landholding ki, and there is no market for land. All agents have the same
endowment of time, h, which they allocate between labor, hi and leisure, li.
The village has total land K, and there are two types of individuals, landless and landowning. A
proportion θ ∈ (0,1) of the village is landless or has kp = 0, and the remaining villagers have equally
sized plots of land. That is, a proportion 1 − θ of the villagers have kr = K
(1−θ)N. The subscript p
denotes ‘poor’ and r denotes ‘rich’.
Production in period 1 is Cobb-Douglas in labor and land,





where β ∈ (0,1) and di is the labor input (demand) used by individual i, including both own and





AH with probability 1
2
AL with probability 1
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with AH > AL. Let A ≡ (AH + AL)/2.
In period 2, income is exogenous. An individual earns yi, the value of which is such that if
there is a good shock in period 1, he would want to save in order to optimize the marginal utility of
consumption across periods, and conversely if there is a bad shock, he would want to borrow. The
purpose of yi in the model is solely to generate this borrowing and saving behavior.6
6The value of yi is assumed to be weakly increasing in landholding to ensure that landowners are always wealthier
than the landless. The mathematical appendix shows that for all parameter values, there exist values of yi such that, in
equilibrium, individuals transfer assets from period 1 to period 2 if e A = AH, and from period 2 to period 1 if e A = AL.
5Individuals have identical Stone-Geary preferences over consumption and leisure,
u(cit,lit) = log(cit − c) + 1−α
α loglit
where α ∈ (0,1). The consumption good is nonstorable and diﬀerent from the production good, and
its price is normalized to 1. Individuals must consume at least the subsistence level c ≥ 0. (Parameter
restrictions given in the mathematical appendix ensure this is feasible.) Note that setting c = 0 gives
Cobb-Douglas preferences. Utility is additive and separable across periods with a subjective discount
factor b. Indirect utility is denoted by Ui.
An individual may borrow or save at an exogenous interest rate r ≥ 0; the village is a small open
economy with respect to the ﬁnancial market. Agents must have nonnegative assets at the end of
period 2. Financial transactions are costly. The eﬀective interest rate for savings is r − φ and the
eﬀective interest rate for borrowing is r + φ. I refer to φ ∈ (0,r), which may depend on landholding,
as the banking cost.7




i(h − li). Note that
agents make their choices after observing the realization of e A, and they have rational expectations
about other agents’ choices. Therefore agents’ choices are optimal at the equilibrium wage.
B. Individual Maximization Problem
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logli + blog(ci2 − c) (1)
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i − diw + w(h − li) − ci1

+ yi
An individual has three choice variables in period 1: his leisure li, the quantity of labor di to use on
his land, and consumption ci1. The only choice for period 2 is consumption ci2. (The subscript for
consumption indicates individual i and period t. I omit the time subscript for other variables.) The
agent maximizes the sum of period-1 utility and period-2 utility discounted by b. Utility in period 1
depends on how much is consumed beyond subsistence and on leisure. Since leisure is not a choice in
A supplemental appendix available from the author considers the cases where agents do not shift assets between periods
in one of the states. The results do not change.
7The results hold if the cost of borrowing is allowed to diﬀer from the cost of saving. The formulation with a single
parameter simpliﬁes the model. In some of the analysis, φ is allowed to diﬀer for landowners versus the landless.
6period 2, it enters the maximand as a constant that is set to 0, and period-2 utility depends only on
consumption net of c.
The intertemporal budget constraint requires that ci2 not exceed the amount transferred from
period 1, which may be positive or negative and includes interest payments, plus yi. The eﬀective
interest rate is r−φ if the individual transfers a positive amount from period 1 to period 2, i.e. saves,
and r+φ if he borrows. (The symbol 1 is an indicator function.) The two sources of period-1 income
are land proﬁts, which equal output minus the wage bill, and labor income.
C. Labor Demand Solution
The labor demand decision is separable from other choices. A landowner chooses his labor demand
by equating the marginal product of labor and the wage,
∂f
∂di













Land proﬁts are thus












Since there are constant returns to scale, labor demand decisions are linear in landownership, implying
that the total amount of land in the village aﬀects aggregate labor demand, but how it is distributed
does not.
D. Labor Supply Solution
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Individual labor supply is declining in landownership, as seen from the last term. Leisure is a normal
good, and individuals with more land are wealthier. Two other features of labor supply are worth
noting. First, since land proﬁts are linear in landownership, given the utility function, labor supply is
as well. Thus, aggregate labor supply is independent of the land distribution. (This result does not
hold in general, e.g., in the extended model with migration or at a corner solution in which landowners
8The supplemental appendix considers corner solutions where landowners supply no labor.
7supply no labor.) Second, landowners supply labor more elastically than the landless. The derivative
with respect to w of the last term in the expression for h∗
i is increasing in ki.
E. Deﬁnition of Wage Elasticity
Setting aggregate labor supply equal to aggregate labor demand determines the equilibrium wage.
Let wH denote the wage in the state e A = AH and wL denote the wage when e A = AL. The primary
focus of the results will be the elasticity of the wage with respect to productivity, or wage elasticity.
Deﬁnition. The wage elasticity is the arc elasticity of the wage with respect to productivity across















Since AH and AL are exogenous parameters, comparative statics for ν depend on the quantity wH−wL
wH+wL.
Taking derivatives, it follows that for any parameter x, ∂ν






This section derives the relationships between the wage elasticity and factors such as poverty and the
ability to save and borrow. The distributional implications of changes in the wage elasticity are also
considered. Subsection III.D extends the model to analyze migration. All proofs are in an appendix
available from the journal’s website.
A. Eﬀect of Poverty
A deﬁning characteristic of developing countries is that productivity relative to the subsistence level
is lower than in developed countries. In the model, the average level of productivity, A, relative to
the subsistence level, c, can be regarded as a measure of how rich (speciﬁcally technology-rich) the
economy is. Conversely, the subsistence level c, for given levels of AH and AL, is a measure of poverty.
Poverty, which here is deﬁned as a characteristic of the economy rather than of certain individuals
within the economy, will aﬀect how responsive the wage is to changes in TFP because when workers
are closer to subsistence, they supply labor less elastically.
8Proposition (1). The wage elasticity is increasing in poverty, where poverty is parameterized by the
ratio of the subsistence level to average TFP (
c
A); for ﬁxed A, ∂ν
∂c > 0.
Poverty aﬀects the ﬁrst moment of the wage; in a poorer area, more labor is supplied and the
wage is lower in both states of the world. Poverty also aﬀects the second moment because the income
elasticity of labor supply is more pronounced in the low-productivity state, when consumption is closer
to c. Labor supply therefore is more inelastic in poor places. The implication is that equilibrium
eﬀects are especially likely to amplify the eﬀect of productivity shocks on wages in developing countries
and, within developing countries, in poorer areas.
Poverty could have other eﬀects on labor supply that are not modeled. For example, a worker’s
productivity may improve when he is better nourished (Leibenstein 1957, Bliss and Stern 1978,
Dasgupta and Ray 1986). If bad shocks force poor workers out of the labor market because of
malnourishment, then poverty instead could increase the labor supply elasticity.
B. Eﬀect of Borrowing and Saving
I next examine how the ability to smooth consumption intertemporally aﬀects the wage elasticity.
Proposition (2). The wage elasticity is increasing in banking costs, or ∂ν
∂φ > 0.
Banking costs aﬀect the degree to which individuals save when there is a good shock and borrow
when there is a bad shock. When there is a good shock, a worker has a greater incentive to supply
labor if he can more easily shift income to period 2. Without the ability to save, working more will
raise his period-1 consumption, which has a decreasing marginal beneﬁt. Raising his period-1 income
is more valuable if he can also shift income to period 2, when the marginal utility of consumption
is higher. Similarly, when there is a negative shock, if individuals cannot borrow as easily against
their period-2 income, they are compelled to work more in period 1, driving down the wage and
exacerbating wage volatility. High banking costs therefore imply more inelastic labor supply and, in
turn, larger wage responses to TFP shocks.
C. Welfare Implications of Wage Fluctuations—Landless versus Landowners
An important facet of wage ﬂuctuations is that they aﬀect landless and landowning individuals dif-
ferently, and if a policy aﬀects the wage elasticity, rich and poor people will have diﬀerent preferences
toward it. Given their risk aversion, agents are averse to income ﬂuctuations (holding the price of the
consumption good ﬁxed). For the landless, income is proportional to the wage, and therefore indirect
9utility is concave in the wage. Landowners, on the other hand, also earn income from their land for
which the wage is an input price. Proﬁt functions are convex in input prices, so mean-preserving
spreads in the wage increase average land proﬁts. Wage variance caused by TFP shocks has an ad-
ditional special feature: the wage is lower precisely when land is less productive and proﬁts are low.
Thus, a higher wage elasticity acts as insurance for a landowner. For these reasons, it is possible that
landowners would oppose a reduction in the cost of ﬁnancial transactions.
Proposition (3).
(i) An increase in the banking fee of the landless can make a landowner better oﬀ in expectation.
That is, if φ = φp for ki = 0, then ∃ parameter values such that ∂EUr
∂φp > 0.
(ii) An increase in the economy-wide cost of borrowing can make a landowner better oﬀ. That is,
if all agents face the banking cost φ, then ∃ parameter values such that ∂Ur
∂φ > 0 in the state
e A = AL.
Part (i) considers the welfare implications if landless workers’ ability to borrow and save changes.9
Landless individuals enjoy a direct beneﬁt if their banking cost declines since they are better able to
smooth consumption. In addition, the wage in the event of bad shocks increases, and the wage in the
event of good shocks decreases. A landowner experiences only the equilibrium eﬀect, and the eﬀect
can make him worse oﬀ. For a large landowner, smaller wage ﬂuctuations have the adverse eﬀect
of making income more volatile. Consider the case of a negative shock to TFP. The shock lowers
the productivity of land, and land proﬁts fall. With more elastic labor supply, a landowner must
pay a relatively higher wage in this state of the world and his proﬁts fall by more. For a risk averse
landowner, this cost outweighs the beneﬁt of elastic labor supply, namely a lower wage in the event
of good shocks.
Inelastic labor supply is like insurance for a landowner: it boosts proﬁts in bad times and reduces
proﬁts in good times. A market often plays more than one role when other markets are missing. In
this economy which lacks an insurance market, the labor market allocates workers’ time, and it also
allocates income risk between workers and landowners. An intervention like a lower banking cost
that makes labor supply more elastic ampliﬁes the eﬀect that shocks have on land proﬁts and shifts
income risk toward landowners.
A reduction in the economy-wide cost of credit can also hurt a landowner, according to part
(ii). Here a landowner’s own cost of borrowing is lowered as well. In partial equilibrium, lower
9In practice, landowners and the landless usually do have diﬀerent banking costs. The cost of borrowing is lower for
landowners because their land can act as collateral.
10credit fees are Pareto-improving in this economy: every agent beneﬁts from being better able to
smooth consumption. However, the equilibrium wage eﬀect—a lower wage elasticity—further helps
the landless, but can hurt landowners. If the eﬀects on the wage are strong enough, on net a landowner
is better oﬀ with more friction in the credit market, despite his lessened ability to shift income
intertemporally.
D. Eﬀects of Migration
This section extends the model to examine the eﬀects of migration costs and also considers how the
land distribution can aﬀect the wage through its eﬀects on migration.
An individual has the choice of whether to migrate in period 1 to another labor market that pays
a ﬁxed wage W. Individuals have independent migration costs drawn from a uniform distribution,
e ∆i ∼ U[∆min,∆min + ψ]. For comparative statics, ψ > 0 will parameterize the overall level of
migration costs. For simplicity I assume that ∆min is suﬃciently large given W that migration is
never optimal when TFP is high. The condition is given in the mathematical appendix.
An individual’s maximand is as was given above in (1). He has an additional choice Migratei ∈
{0,1}, and his budget constraint becomes
ci2 ≤(1 + (r − φ)1(ci2 > yi) + (r + φ)1(ci2 < yi))

πi + w(h − li) + ((W − w)(h − li) − e ∆i)Migratei − ci1

+ yi
When the agent stays in the village, he earns the wage w, and when he migrates he earns W but
must pay the migration cost e ∆i. The incentive to migrate will be decreasing in the cost e ∆i. Deﬁne
∆r as the maximum migration cost such that migrating is individually optimal for a landowner, and
∆p as the maximum migration cost such that migrating is optimal for a landless individual, given the
equilibrium wage.
Proposition (4).
(i) The wage elasticity is increasing in migration costs, or ∂ν
∂ψ > 0.
(ii) The landless have a higher propensity to move than landowners, or ∆p > ∆r.
(iii) The wage elasticity is decreasing in the proportion of individuals who are landless, or ∂ν
∂θ < 0.
11Part (i) formalizes the fact that when migration costs are lower, more individuals migrate out,
and labor supply in the economy is lower. This implies a higher wage in the event of e A = AL which
is equivalent to a reduction in the wage elasticity. While only out-migration is modeled, in-migration
would also reduce the wage elasticity. Suppose the model were extended to two symmetric economies
with uncorrelated productivity shocks and both out- and in-migration were allowed. Then when one
village had a better shock than the other, in-migration would increase labor supply in the temporarily
higher-TFP village. The inﬂux of labor would reduce the wage associated with a positive TFP shock,
so in-migration also would dampen wage ﬂuctuations.
The intuition for why the landless have a higher propensity to migrate (part (ii)) is straightforward.
A landowner, by virtue of having greater wealth, supplies less labor than a landless person. Thus
he beneﬁts less from the higher price for his labor that is available if he migrates. (No one would
migrate if the outside wage W were less than w.)
Part (iii) relates the land distribution to the elasticity of the wage with respect to TFP. When
there are more landless individuals, more workers migrate out in the event of a bad shock. This is
oﬀset in part by the fact that each landowner is wealthier and less likely to migrate, but the ﬁrst
eﬀect dominates and on net the wage elasticity declines. This result relies on assumptions about the
utility function. Because landholding enters linearly in the labor supply choice, the land distribution
aﬀects aggregate labor supply only through its eﬀect on migration. With other utility functions, the
land distribution could have a direct eﬀect on labor supply, and the net eﬀect of landlessness on the
wage elasticity could be either negative or positive. Therefore, this result should not be interpreted
as general, but instead as an illustration that there are channels such as migration through which
increases in the proportion of workers who are landless could decrease wage volatility.
One implication is that redistribution of land will aﬀect even individuals whose own landholding
is unchanged. Taking land from landowners and giving it to a subset of the landless population could
have a negative pecuniary eﬀect on those individuals who remain landless.10
With endogenous migration in the model, parameters now aﬀect the wage through two channels.
As before, there is an eﬀect on the quantity of labor an individual would supply if he stayed in
the village (intensive margin). Additionally, there is an an eﬀect on migration (extensive margin).
The income gain from migration is proportional to hours worked and to W − w, the amount by
which the outside wage exceeds the local wage, so migration is aﬀected either by a change in w or
a change in the individual’s choice of hours to work. Suppose a parameter increases labor supply
10This result was shown formally in a previous version of the paper. A related literature discusses indirect eﬀects of
agrarian land reform, focusing on provision of public goods such as irrigation (Bardhan, Ghatak, and Karaivanov 2002,
Bardhan 1984, Boyce 1987).
12along the intensive margin. The wage falls. In response, aggregate migration rises. This generates
an oﬀsetting increase in the wage. In addition, the increase in desired hours of work directly makes
migration more attractive, and when more migration is induced, this puts further upward pressure
on the wage. The comparative statics derived above for ψ and θ in Proposition 4 are net results
combining these channels. The earlier results on poverty and banking, on the other hand, need not
hold in general with unrestricted levels of migration. In the low productivity state, the migration
eﬀect—the fact that out-migration levels rise when banking fees increase, for example—can outweigh
the fact that each nonmigrant now supplies more labor. However, as long as migration levels are not
too high, Propositions 1 through 3 generalize, which should be intuitive since the extensive-margin
eﬀects become small in this case.11
IV. Empirical Strategy and Data
A. Empirical Strategy
The theory suggests that certain factors increase the aggregate labor supply elasticity and therefore
decrease the sensitivity of the wage to productivity shocks. I examine these predictions empirically
by making comparisons across labor markets. The unit of observation, or a distinct labor market, is
a geographic area (district) in a given year. The agricultural wage is the market equilibrium outcome
in the following model:
wjt = β1Ajt + β2Sjt + β3Sjt ∗ Ajt + β4Xjt + β5Xjt ∗ Ajt + δt + αj + εjt.
The dependent variable wjt is the natural log of the wage for district j in year t. Ajt is log TFP. Sjt
are characteristics predicted to aﬀect the aggregate labor supply elasticity. Xjt are control variables,
δt and αj are year and district ﬁxed eﬀects, and εjt is the error term. The coeﬃcient β1 measures the
average elasticity of the wage with respect to productivity (if Sjt and Xjt are mean 0). With district
ﬁxed eﬀects included, deviations from the district’s average productivity identify β1.
Workers in some labor markets are better able to smooth consumption in the face of productivity
shocks, for example by adjusting how much they save or dissave or by migrating to work in another
area. The availability of these smoothing mechanisms, measured by Sjt, should increase the aggregate
11The supplemental appendix derives these results. Note that in India, the setting studied below, migration rates are
relatively low, suggesting that poverty and banking costs should increase the wage elasticity. Also note that if migration
were modeled as providing a ﬁxed income or utility level (instead of a higher wage), then the indirect eﬀects on the
wage that occurred due to migration would be second-order, and a parameter could only increase out-migration if it
reduced the local wage. All results would then generalize to the migration case.
13labor supply elasticity and therefore mitigate the eﬀect that productivity shocks have on the wage.
For example, when there is a bad shock, if workers have savings that they can draw from, this reduces
their labor supply and the wage falls by less. Similarly, the wage will increase less in response to good
shocks if there are better opportunities to save because workers will have a greater incentive to take
advantage of the temporarily high labor productivity and supply more labor. Thus, the theoretical
prediction is that β3 < 0: smoothing mechanisms reduce the sensitivity of the wage to productivity
shocks. Testing this prediction is the main empirical objective.
The available measure of agricultural productivity is crop yield, the crop volume produced per
unit of land. Crop yield depends on TFP but is not equivalent to it, since it also depends on the
amounts of labor and other inputs that are used. Thus, with Y ieldjt standing in for Ajt, when the
equation,
wjt = β1Y ieldjt + β2Sjt + β3Sjt ∗ Y ieldjt + β4Xjt + β5Xjt ∗ Y ieldjt + δt + αj + εjt, (2)
is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS), the coeﬃcients on Y ieldjt and its interactions do
not isolate eﬀects due to TFP ﬂuctuations. Therefore I use an instrumental variables (IV) approach
and instrument for crop yield with rainfall shocks (rainfall in excess of the district’s normal rainfall).
Rainfall is used as a source of exogenous variation in TFP where the assumption is that rain aﬀects
crop yield through its eﬀect on TFP. The ﬁrst-stage equation relating crop yield to rainfall is
Y ieldjt =γ1RainShockjt + γ2Sjt + γ3Sjt ∗ RainShockjt + γ4Xjt + γ5Xjt ∗ RainShockjt
+ ηt + λj + ujt, (3)
where ηt and λj are year and district ﬁxed eﬀects, and ujt is the error term. In the estimation of
equation (2), RainShockjt, Sjt ∗ RainShockjt, and Xjt ∗ RainShockjt serve as instruments for the
endogenous regressors, Y ieldjt, Sjt ∗ Y ieldjt, and Xjt ∗ Y ieldjt.
The identiﬁcation strategy assumes that rainfall aﬀects TFP and does not aﬀect workers’ endow-
ment of time or preferences or the shape of the production function. Another important assumption
is that Sjt measures diﬀerences in the labor supply elasticity and not diﬀerences in the size of the pro-
ductivity shock.12 I interpret banks and roads as smoothing mechanisms, but the measures could be
correlated with omitted variables. There are two distinct concerns. First, areas with more banks and
roads might be places where geography or irrigation makes agricultural productivity less sensitive to
12Also, Sjt is interpreted as raising the elasticity of labor supply because of the income eﬀect or substitution to-
ward other labor markets, and not because of substitution toward leisure, e.g., it is not the case that leisure is more
substitutable with consumption where there are roads.
14weather. This problem could confound the reduced-form relationship between rainfall and the wage.
The wage could be less sensitive to rainfall shocks in developed areas simply because ﬂuctuations
in rainfall are causing smaller changes in crop yield. However, the relationship I examine—between
crop yield and the wage—should not be aﬀected by this type of omitted variable problem. The IV
estimator projects RainShockjt and Sjt ∗ RainShockjt onto Y ieldjt and Sjt ∗ Y ieldjt, and is not
biased by a correlation between Y ieldjt and Sjt ∗RainShockjt. Nevertheless, I probe this concern in
subsection IV.E.
The second type of omitted variable problem is if Sjt is correlated with an unobserved measure
of how large the industrial sector is. If agriculture is a smaller part of the labor market in places
with more banks or roads, then ﬂuctuations in agricultural TFP would represent less signiﬁcant
labor demand shocks and therefore would lead to smaller changes in the wage, generating β3 < 0.
This concern is lessened by the fact that the dependent variable is speciﬁcally the agricultural wage.
Nonetheless, the agricultural labor market could be integrated with a broader low-skill labor market.
If there were policies that led to near–random placement of roads or banks, then one could address
the problem by focusing on exogenous variation induced by the policies. Alternatively, if there were
suﬃcient within-district variation over time in Sjt, one could include in the estimating equation
district dummies interacted with the shock variable to absorb time-invariant omitted characteristics
of a district. Unfortunately, in practice, these approaches are infeasible. However, the omitted variable
concern can be partially addressed by controlling for the interaction of Y ieldjt with a measure of how
important agricultural productivity is to overall labor productivity, namely the percentage of the
total workforce that agricultural workers represent, denoted %Agrarianjt.
In addition, section IV.E presents a set of speciﬁcation tests that help distinguish between the
labor supply interpretation of the results and the omitted variable story. The ﬁrst test looks at the
relationship between crop yield, rainfall, and Sjt. Crop yield, which measures output per unit of land,
is increasing not only in TFP but also in the quantity of labor used. The basis of the test is that
crop yield therefore is increasing in labor supply, and should be more sensitive to rainfall shocks when
labor supply is more elastic. In contrast, yield should respond less to rainfall in areas where weather
has a smaller impact on agricultural TFP.
The second test uses crop prices as the dependent variable in a model analogous to equation (2).
The logic of the test is that a negative shock to agricultural yield induces a negative supply shock
in the product market and should drive up crop prices. The price response will be less pronounced
in more industrialized areas where local output is a smaller part of the agricultural product market.
On the other hand, if Sjt is not just proxying for industrialization but is indeed measuring a higher
15labor supply elasticity, then agricultural output and thus crop prices should be more sensitive to crop
yield shocks where Sjt is larger because relatively more labor is available in good times and less in
bad times. The results of the tests support the conclusion that smoothing mechanisms reduce wage
ﬂuctuations because of their eﬀect on labor supply.
B. Data
I estimate equation (2) where the unit of observation is a district in India in a given year. The panel
comprises 257 rural districts, deﬁned by 1961 boundaries, observed from 1956 to 1987.13 The sample
covers over 80% of India’s land area, including the major agricultural regions. A district in the sample
has on average 400,000 agricultural workers.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample, with more detail provided in the data appen-
dix. The dependent variable, the district-level male agricultural wage, is from the World Bank India
Agriculture and Climate data set and was collected originally by the Indian Ministry of Agriculture.
Crop yield is calculated as the revenue-weighted average of log(volume of crop produced/area cropped)
for the 5 major crops by revenue, where revenue, crop volume, and area cropped are from the World
Bank data set. Annual rainfall for a district, measured at the closest point on a 0.5◦ latitude by 0.5◦
longitude grid, is from the Center for Climatic Research at the University of Delaware. Four types
of district traits are examined: ﬁnancial services, access to other areas, poverty and landownership.
These data are from the World Bank data set, Census of Population (cross-sectional measures from
1981 or 1961, 1971, and 1981 measures, interpolated between years), Agricultural Census, Reserve
Bank of India, and National Sample Survey.
V. Empirical Results on the Wage Response to Productivity Shocks
A. Relationship Between the Agricultural Wage and Crop Yield
I estimate the relationship between the log wage and log crop yield, using rainfall shocks as an
instrument for log crop yield. The relationship between crop yield and rainfall in the sample suggests
that more rain improves agricultural productivity—crop yield increases monotonically with rainfall.
India diﬀers from other settings in which either below- or above-normal rainfall might hurt agricultural
productivity. The variable, RainShock, is constructed accordingly, treating excess rain as a good
13Data are available for 271 districts. I exclude from the sample the 14 districts with measured altitude above 600
meters, as rainfall has a weak relationship with crop yield in these districts. The results presented below are similar,
with larger standard errors, if these districts are included.
16shock and a shortfall as a bad shock.14 Previous work on India uses similar speciﬁcations (Jacoby
and Skouﬁas 1997, Kochar 1997, Rose 2001). The RainShock variable equals 1 if the annual rainfall
is above the 80th percentile for the district, 0 if it is between the 80th and 20th percentiles, or -1 if it
is below the 20th percentile. When coeﬃcients for rainfall above the 80th percentile and for rainfall
below the 20th percentile are estimated separately, one cannot reject that they have equal magnitude,
so I impose this restriction to improve power. The results presented are similar but less precise if the
fractional deviation from the district’s mean annual rainfall is used as the measure of RainShock.
The distribution of rainfall used to construct the variables is for the period 1956 to 1987.
Column 1 of Table 2 shows the ﬁrst-stage relationship between log crop yield and rainfall. A
rainfall shock causes a 7% change in crop yield.15 The t-statistic of the estimate is 9.3. Because
there may be spatial correlation in rainfall, standard errors allow for clustering within a region-year,
where a National Sample Survey region comprises 7 districts on average. The regression includes
district and year ﬁxed eﬀects and the interaction of RainShock with %Agrarian, the proportion of
the workforce in agriculture in 1961 (since the interaction of crop yield and %Agrarian will be a
control variable in the second stage).
Column 2 of Table 2 presents the OLS relationship between the wage and crop yield.16 The
coeﬃcient on log crop yield, which represents the elasticity of the wage with respect to yield, is .035.
Higher productivity seems to lead to a higher wage. Yield depends both on TFP and on inputs besides
land, so the coeﬃcient lacks a straightforward interpretation, however. Speciﬁcally, the coeﬃcient is
likely to be smaller than the desired estimand, the elasticity of the wage with respect to TFP, because
of the following source of endogeneity. Suppose a labor market experiences a positive shock to labor
supply (for example, because of negative demand shocks in other industries). First, the wage will
decrease. Second, producers will use more labor, and therefore crop yield (output per unit of land)
will increase. This eﬀect generates a negative correlation of the wage and crop yield, biasing the OLS
coeﬃcient downward. Column 3 presents the IV estimate of the relationship between the wage and
crop yield. Rainfall, as the instrument for crop yield, should be isolating eﬀects due to exogenous
changes in TFP. Here, the elasticity of the wage with respect to productivity is .17. The larger IV
14The Ministry of Agriculture tracks which areas have below–average rain each rainy season and groups together those
with average or above–average rain, suggesting that shortfalls are of greatest concern. Extreme ﬂooding presumably
would be an exception. See Das (1995) on rainfall and agricultural productivity in India.
15Because of measurement error in RainShock, the coeﬃcient is probably an underestimate of the eﬀect of weather
on crop yield. Rainfall calculated at one point is used to describe rain for a district’s entire area. In smaller districts,
where this problem should be less important, the coeﬃcient on rainfall is signiﬁcantly larger. Also, rainfall for that one
point is interpolated from several nearby weather stations. In addition, excess rainfall is a crude approximation of the
weather shocks that aﬀect agricultural productivity.
16Theoretically, lagged shocks also might aﬀect the wage, for example if successive bad shocks deplete one’s buﬀer
stock savings. Empirically, I do not ﬁnd an eﬀect of lagged shocks.
17estimate conﬁrms that productivity ﬂuctuations are not the only source of variation in crop yield in
the data. In addition, if crop yield is measured with classical measurement error, the IV estimates
may be correcting attenuation bias in the OLS estimate.17
As discussed above, one concern is that the agricultural wage might be less sensitive to agricultural
productivity where the nonagricultural sector is more important in the local economy. Therefore
the regression includes as a control variable Y ield interacted with the fraction of the workforce in
agriculture. If the agricultural wage measures an overall unskilled wage, it should be more sensitive
to crop yield in more agrarian areas, but the interaction coeﬃcient is negative, though small and
insigniﬁcant. This result suggests that the agrarian labor market may be fairly distinct from the
nonagrarian labor market. Another potential explanation is that the control variable is not a good
measure of sectoral composition. However, results presented in section IV.E suggest that the variable
is in fact a meaningful measure.
Note that all variables interacted with crop yield have been standardized to have a mean of 0 and
standard deviation of 1 to ease interpretation. The coeﬃcient on %Agrarian∗Y ield implies that for
every standard deviation increase in the proportion of workers in agriculture, the wage becomes less
sensitive to the weather shock by 0.9 log points. Column 3 is the speciﬁcation augmented below to
test whether banking and other factors aﬀect the wage elasticity.
The estimate of the elasticity of the wage with respect to crop yield allows one to calculate
the magnitude of typical wage ﬂuctuations caused by productivity shocks. Crop yield in a district
ﬂuctuates considerably year-to-year. Figure 2 depicts the distribution of the residual when log crop
yield is regressed on district-speciﬁc linear time trends and year eﬀects. The standard deviation of the
residual is 21 log points. This variation also captures measurement error in crop yield, so 21 log points
is likely an upper bound on the standard deviation of actual TFP shocks. A 21% shock, given the
estimated elasticity of .17 (column 3), corresponds to a 3.5% wage ﬂuctuation. A decline in earning
power of even this magnitude is likely to be economically important to those who are very poor, and
the rarer events when crop yield and the wage fall sharply would have more severe consequences.
B. Banking
Table 3 presents results on the relationship between ﬁnancial development and the wage elasticity.
Proposition 2 suggests that access to banking should reduce the sensitivity of the wage to productivity
shocks, or that the coeﬃcient on Banking∗Y ield should be negative. In columns 1 and 2, banking is
17The reason the OLS and IV estimates diﬀer does not seem to be that large deviations from typical rainfall are the
identifying variation with the discrete RainShock measure. The IV estimate is similar (.14) when the instrument is a
continuous measure, namely the fractional deviation from the district’s mean rainfall.
18measured as per capita deposits and per capita credit. In both cases, banking reduces the responsive-
ness of the wage to shocks, and the estimates are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% and 10% levels,
respectively. These results are IV estimates where the variables RainShock, Banking ∗ RainShock,
and %Agrarian ∗ RainShock are instruments for Y ield, Banking ∗ Y ield, and %Agrarian ∗ Y ield.
Note that for time-invariant measures of Banking, the level eﬀect is absorbed by the district ﬁxed
eﬀect. The ﬁnal measure of banking, the number of bank branches per capita, also reduces the
magnitude of wage ﬂuctuations (column 3).18
The coeﬃcients on the interaction terms are sizable. In column 1, moving from the mean level of
bank deposits to one standard deviation below the mean, the wage becomes over 50% more sensitive
to crop yield shocks (an increase from 16% to 25%). In fact, one might worry that for large positive
values of Banking, this implies that the wage is decreasing in Y ield. Banking, however, rarely takes
on large positive values. For 95% of the sample, the bank deposit variable is below 1.78, the threshold
at which the wage would begin to decrease with Y ield. Moreover, taking into account estimation error
(i.e., using a t-test), one cannot reject that the wage is increasing in Y ield up to the 99th percentile
of the bank deposit variable.
Workers need not directly use the formal banking sector to beneﬁt from it. Probably few landless
workers borrow through the formal sector during this period, but many receive loans from infor-
mal lenders or landlords who in turn use the formal banking sector. Banking might also enable
entrepreneurs to expand nonagricultural businesses when agricultural productivity is low, creating
an alternative use for labor. Analogously, Foster and Rosenzweig (2003) argue that industrial capital
migrates to low-wage areas to explain their ﬁnding that rural industrialization in India has been more
rapid in villages where agricultural productivity has been stagnant.
C. Access to Neighboring Areas
In places where workers can migrate more easily to other labor markets in response to unfavorable
local labor market conditions (or where there is more in-migration when the local labor market is
strong), the wage should be less responsive to productivity changes, as seen in Proposition 4(i). I use
measures of a district’s physical connectedness with neighboring areas, which should be associated
18Diﬀerent measures of ﬁnancial services enable one to test whether certain facets of ﬁnancial services have a stronger
relationship with the wage elasticity than others, and to check whether the results are robust to changing the way
ﬁnancial services are measured. The diﬀerent measures are positively correlated, so if all of the Banking ∗ Y ield
variables are included in a single regression, they do not all have negative coeﬃcients. This is also true for the measures
of access examined below.
19with lower costs of migration, to test this prediction.19 The results are presented in Table 4. Column
1 uses road density (length of paved roads per area of land) as the measure of access to other areas.
In areas with lower road density the wage elasticity is higher, consistent with the prediction, although
this estimate is imprecise. In columns 2 and 3, the measures of accessibility are the proportion of
villages with bus service and with a railway station. Better bus or rail access leads to a signiﬁcant
reduction in the wage elasticity. Finally, the estimate in column 4 suggests that if a district is closer to
a city, which likely facilitates rural-to-urban migration, then the wage is less sensitive to local shocks.
The closeness variable is the inverse of the distance between the geographic center of the district and
the nearest city with a 1981 population of at least 500,000.
D. Poverty and Landholding
Income eﬀects are likely to be particularly pronounced for the very poor, implying that the aggregate
labor supply elasticity may decline as the poverty rate in an area increases. On the other hand, the
poor have a greater incentive to out-migrate to higher–wage areas in response to negative shocks.
This might be especially true if the poor are landless. In a region of Gujarat studied by Breman
(1996), 25% of the population but 50% of out-migrants were landless. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that there is also a moral hazard cost of being an absentee landlord that deters landowners from
migrating (Bardhan 1977). Thus, the presence of poor workers could on net increase or reduce the
wage elasticity in the home market.
In addition to the propensity to migrate, there are other reasons not addressed here why the land-
less might have more elastic labor supply than landowners. One possibility is that malnourishment
reduces labor productivity and causes unemployment (Leibenstein 1957, Bliss and Stern 1978, Das-
gupta and Ray 1986). If the landless are less healthy than landowners, they may be more likely to be
forced into unemployment when hit by a negative shock. A greater proportion of poor people in the
potential labor force could lead to lower aggregate labor supply in bad times relative to good times,
or more elastic aggregate labor supply. Smaller wage ﬂuctuations would not be welfare-enhancing for
the poor if they were not earning wages in lean times.
19The variables might also be measuring how open the goods markets are. However, an integrated market for the
goods produced by the agricultural sector would likely exacerbate the impact of shocks, for example if prices become
less countercyclical as discussed by Newbery and Stiglitz (1984).
201. Labor supply elasticity and migration of the landless versus landowners
Before examining the wage eﬀects of landownership and poverty, I provide evidence on the basic
facts that, ﬁrst, among workers who stay in the home market, labor supply elasticity is increasing
in landownership and, second, the landless have a higher propensity to migrate in response to bad
shocks. To do so, I use an individual-level data set on rural India, the International Crops Research
Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) study. ICRISAT surveyed 40 households in each of 6
villages between 1975 and 1979 and in the original 6 plus 4 more villages from 1980 to 1984.
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for the ICRISAT samples used. Data on labor supply are
not available for all villages and years, so I use a subsample of 3 villages during 1975-9. The sample
consists of adult male household members who are supplying labor in the village, and the unit of
observation is an individual-month. Rainfall during July and August, collected by ICRISAT, serves
as a proxy for productivity. The amount of rain during these monsoon months is the most critical for
agriculture, but the reason for this restriction is more pragmatic: the rainfall data for other months
are missing in many cases.20 There are four categories of landholding: landless, small landowner,
medium landowner, and large landowner. Ten landless households were sampled per village, and then
10 households for each tercile of the village-speciﬁc land distribution. The measure of labor supply
is hours worked in agriculture per day. For the estimates of migration, data for all 10 villages are
available and the sample consists of adult male household members, present or absent. Households
provided information about absent members (e.g., whether they moved temporarily, the reason for
the move) that I use to construct a measure of whether an individual has migrated temporarily for
work. The average migration rate is 4%.
Table 6 provides evidence that an individual’s labor supply elasticity is increasing in landown-
ership. As shown in column 1, landowners have a positive labor supply elasticity; a one standard
deviation decrease in rainfall (-.16 in the units of RainShock) leads to an 8.4% decrease in labor
supply. The landless have a signiﬁcantly lower labor supply elasticity than landowners; they reduce
labor supply by only 3.7% in response to the same shock. The landless also work more hours overall.
Column 2 separately estimates the labor supply and labor supply elasticity for the 4 landholding
categories. While the estimates are imprecise, the pattern of coeﬃcients shows that, in general, the
poorer the stratum, the more hours worked and the less elastic the labor supply. The regressions
include village, year, and month ﬁxed eﬀects and control for the number of working male adults in the
20Since the panel is short, the RainShock variable is not measured relative to the village mean, but this should not
aﬀect the comparisons across landholding groups since the sample is stratiﬁed by landholding. (The results are the same
when a full set of village dummy variables interacted with RainShock is included.)
21household and its interaction with RainShock. Standard errors are corrected for clustering within
households.
Conditional on their staying in an area beset by a bad shock, landless workers have a lower labor
supply elasticity. The fact that they work more hours than landowners suggests they also would have
more to gain by migrating to a higher-wage market. Indeed, consistent with Proposition 4(ii), I ﬁnd
that the landless are more likely to out-migrate for work in response to bad shocks. Column 3 of Table
6 compares the propensity to temporarily migrate among landowners and the landless. Results for a
probit model are shown; unreported OLS results are similar. The behavior of landowners is unaﬀected
by the rain shock, while a negative shock signiﬁcantly increases a landless individual’s likelihood of
migrating. A one-standard-deviation negative shock increases his probability of migrating by 25%.
Column 4 shows the propensity to migrate for all 4 landholding groups. One interesting result is
that small landowners have a lower propensity to migrate than medium and large landowners. This
is suggestive that smaller landowners may be disadvantaged in using hired help and managing their
land in absentia.21 This also suggests that the high propensity of the landless to migrate may not
only be because they are the poorest group, but also because they do not face the cost of leaving
behind their land.
Empirically, landless individuals have oﬀsetting eﬀects on the wage elasticity. Within the home
market, they supply labor more inelastically which should contribute to a larger decline in the wage
when TFP suﬀers a negative shock, but they are also more likely to migrate to other areas which
should mitigate the local impact of a bad shock. I now turn to estimating in the main agricultural
wage data set the net impact that poor or landless individuals have on the wage elasticity.
2. Poverty, landholding patterns, and wage responses
Table 7 examines how the wage elasticity varies with income and land ownership. First, I use two
poverty measures constructed from expenditure data in the 1987-8 National Sample Survey: average
per capita expenditure and the fraction of households below a poverty line of 14,000 rupees per
year in expenditures, approximately the World Bank poverty line (columns 1-2).22 The theoretical
prediction (Proposition 1) is that poorer places, where average TFP is lower, should experience large
wage adjustments to TFP shocks since workers supply labor inelastically in order to maintain their
near-subsistence income levels. Empirically, the interaction between per capita expenditure and Y ield
21This pattern of migration is consistent with an extension of the model in which absentee landownership is costly,
and the costs are decreasing in landownership because, for example, a small landowner must search for someone to
manage his land while a large landowner already employs a manager.
22NSS data are not available at the district level for earlier years.
22is negative but insigniﬁcant, consistent with but not strong evidence of a greater wage elasticity in
poorer areas. The poverty head count ratio does not have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on the
wage elasticity.
Columns 3 and 4 examine two measures of landholding patterns. The ﬁrst is the proportion of
agricultural workers who are landless.23 The wage is signiﬁcantly less responsive to productivity
shocks when the fraction landless is higher. A plausible explanation in light of the ICRISAT evidence
is that labor migration in response to shocks—which acts to dampen wage ﬂuctuations—is increasing
in the fraction landless. There may also be other explanations for the result. One possibility is that
malnourishment causes the landless to supply less labor in the event of bad shocks, although I ﬁnd
the opposite result along the hours margin in the ICRISAT sample. It is worth noting that unlike
bank or road density, the proportion landless is negatively correlated with most measures of economic
development, so the negative coeﬃcient on %Landless∗Y ield is unlikely to be driven by an omitted
measure of economic development.
The second measure of landownership I examine is the Gini coeﬃcient of landholding calculated
among landowners. The measure is constructed using data on the number of landowners in ﬁve size
categories, as described in the data appendix. Greater land inequality among the landed does not
have a signiﬁcant impact on the wage elasticity.
E. Speciﬁcation Tests Using Crop Yield and Crop Prices
One concern with the estimates in Tables 3, 4 and 7 is that factors like bank or road density might be
measuring an omitted variable, either insensitivity of agricultural productivity to weather or lack of
importance of agricultural productivity in the labor market. That is, the concern is that the estimates
may not be identifying varying labor supply responses to a given TFP shock, but instead diﬀerences
in the intensity of the TFP shock. To allay these concerns, I present two speciﬁcation tests that
help distinguish between the labor supply explanation that I have put forth and the omitted variable
explanation.
The ﬁrst test examines whether crop yield is more or less sensitive to RainShock in areas where S
is higher, that is, where banks, roads, and landlessness are more prevalent. This relationship is simply
the ﬁrst stage for Y ield for the IV estimates presented above (equation (3)). The fact that Y ield is
23The Census categorizes agricultural workers as wage laborers if they work on others’ land or as cultivators if they
work on their own land. The proportion of wage laborers among all agricultural workers is the approximate measure
of landlessness in the agricultural workforce. The ideal workforce measure would be potential workers including out-
migrants and excluding in-migrants. This is unlikely to be a problem in practice since the workforce measure is decennial
while the weather and wage data are annual.
23increasing both in productivity and in the quantity of available labor makes the ﬁrst stage useful as
a speciﬁcation test. Suppose the omitted variable explanation is correct. Then, in a place where S is
higher, the productivity shock associated with RainShock would be less intense and the coeﬃcient
on S∗RainShock should be negative. In contrast, if labor supply is more elastic when S is high, then
in the event of a good shock, more labor is available. The labor used per area and, in turn, the output
per area, or crop yield, should be higher as S increases, and the coeﬃcient on S ∗ RainShock should
be positive. A negative coeﬃcient on S ∗ RainShock would suggest that an omitted variable drives
the wage elasticity results presented above, while a positive coeﬃcient supports the interpretation
that banks, roads, and landlessness reduce the wage elasticity because they raise the labor supply
elasticity.
Table 8 presents the results of this test. The dependent variable is crop yield and the independent
variables include RainShock, S ∗ RainShock, and %Agrarian ∗ RainShock (the instruments in the
IV estimates presented above), as well as the main eﬀect of S and district and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
In columns 1–3, the measures of S are bank deposits, road density and the percent landless. The
estimated coeﬃcients for the interaction eﬀects with bank deposits is statistically signiﬁcantly positive,
positive for road density, and negative but essentially zero for percent landless. These estimates largely
support the labor supply elasticity explanation of the main results.24
The second test uses an index of crop prices as the dependent variable in a model otherwise
identical to that described by equation (2). (The data appendix further describes the crop price
variable.) A positive shock to agricultural productivity should induce a positive supply shock in the
product market, and crop prices should decline (negative main eﬀect on Y ield). The interaction term,
S ∗ Y ield, then provides a distinguishing test. Suppose banks, roads, or landlessness are measuring
more industrialized areas. In places with higher S, the price eﬀect should be smaller because in
nonagrarian areas, locally produced goods will constitute a smaller portion of total supply in the
agricultural product market. The interaction coeﬃcient for S ∗Y ield should be positive. In contrast,
if S is aﬀecting the labor supply elasticity, a higher value of S implies more labor is available in the
event of a positive TFP shock. Agricultural output and crop prices should be more responsive to the
shock, or the interaction coeﬃcient should be negative.
The results of this test are given in Table 8, columns 4-7. With log crop price as the dependent
24A related test uses the area cropped as the dependent variable. Farmers choose whether to farm marginal land and
when TFP is high, the area planted should increase. RainShock should and does lead to an increase in area cropped.
The smaller the good shock, the smaller the increase in area planted, so the omitted variable problem would lead to
the coeﬃcient on S ∗ RainShock being negative. If instead S indicates that relatively more labor is supplied during
high-TFP years, then with complementary labor and land, area cropped will increase more if S is larger. In results
not reported, I ﬁnd positive and signiﬁcant interaction eﬀects for bank deposits, road density and percent landless, in
support of the labor supply channel.
24variable, the main eﬀect of log crop yield is negative, as expected; a boost to supply in the product
market leads to lower crop prices. Next consider the interactions of crop yield and S. If S were a proxy
for industrialization, one would expect these coeﬃcients to be positive. The interaction coeﬃcient for
%Landless is negative and signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and the coeﬃcients for bank and road density
are negative and positive, respectively, but imprecise in both cases.
Also notable is that the coeﬃcient on %Agrarian ∗ Y ield is negative, large, and statistically
signiﬁcant (see column 4). In more agrarian areas as measured by %Agrarian, where local out-
put is presumably more important in the product market, crop prices are more responsive to local
productivity, as one would expect. The strong predictive power of the fraction of the workforce in
agriculture suggests that this variable is a good measure of how agrarian an area is. Therefore, in
the wage regressions presented above, the inclusion of %Agrarian∗Y ield as a control variable should
be reducing the likelihood of omitted variable bias. The fact that in the wage regressions the coef-
ﬁcient on %Agrarian ∗ Y ield is small and insigniﬁcant seems to indicate that the agricultural and
nonagricultural labor markets are distinct.
In sum, the results of the two tests suggest that banking, transportation, and landlessness are
measuring diﬀerences in the elasticity of labor supply rather than omitted variables and that wage
ﬂuctuations are more pronounced in underdeveloped areas because workers have more limited means
of responding to risk.
VI. Conclusion
Productivity risk is endemic in underdeveloped areas. Agricultural production is sensitive to drought,
ﬂoods, pestilence, price ﬂuctuations, and other events. This paper has shown theoretically and
empirically that several fundamental characteristics of impoverished areas conspire to exacerbate this
risk for workers.
In a model of an agricultural sector that employs labor and land and faces productivity risk,
the closer workers are to subsistence, the more inelastically they supply labor and the more the
wage moves in response to productivity shocks. Higher costs of migrating, borrowing, and saving
also amplify wage ﬂuctuations. Empirically, a better developed banking system and better access to
other areas are important in explaining the sensitivity of the wage to TFP shocks. For example, in
the sample of 257 Indian districts observed over a 32-year period, moving from the average level of
transportation infrastructure to one standard deviation below the average makes the wage 50% more
sensitive to weather-cum-productivity shocks.
25The distribution of wealth is important both in explaining the responsive of the wage to produc-
tivity changes and in understanding its welfare consequences. The prevalence of landlessness among
agricultural workers was found to reduce the elasticity of the wage with respect to productivity.
Individual-level data supported the explanation that the landless have a particularly high propensity
to out-migrate when local agricultural conditions are unfavorable. In addition, wage ﬂuctuations have
diﬀerent welfare implications for rich and poor. Volatile wages hurt the poor since their main asset is
their labor. For the rich who are net buyers of labor, a greater wage elasticity can be beneﬁcial. This
implies that improvements in the banking sector—or other policies that aﬀect how labor responds to
shocks—have redistributional as well as level eﬀects on welfare.
The ﬁndings have at least three broader implications. First, certain types of openness may help
the poor. Labor mobility is an important means of responding to productivity risk when shocks
are local. A better developed ﬁnancial sector is also beneﬁcial, particularly when integrated with
other areas so that the interest rate does not move in lockstep with local shocks.25 Second, land
redistribution from the rich to the poor could have counterintuitive eﬀects. If land redistribution
decreases out-migration, it could have a negative pecuniary eﬀect on individuals who remain landless.
The empirical result that small landowners are particularly unlikely to migrate is further reason to
believe that land redistribution could have unexpected eﬀects on individual choices and, in turn,
on equilibrium outcomes. Third, the diﬀerent preferences of the rich and poor toward institutions
that enable consumption smoothing may have important political economy implications. At ﬁrst
blush, improving ﬁnancial services would seem to beneﬁt all individuals in an economy subject to
productivity risk and income volatility, since everyone beneﬁts from being better able to smooth their
consumption. However, when eﬀects on the equilibrium wage are considered, an improvement in
ﬁnancial services could do more harm than good for landowners since they then have to pay workers
a higher wage in bad times. These considerations may aﬀect political support for policies such as
improved banking that are in the interest of the poor and that promote economic growth.
25The paper has focused on “distress sales” of labor, but similar price eﬀects are likely to occur in other markets. For
example, Jodha (1975) reports that during the 1963–4 drought in Rajasthan, India, households sold down assets such
as camels, sheep, and bullock carts and the prices of these goods fell sharply, in part because of the supply glut.
26Data Appendix
Agricultural wage
The agricultural wage data are from the World Bank India Agricultural and Climate data set. The data
set covers 271 districts, deﬁned by 1961 boundaries, in 13 states (Haryana, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat,
Rajasthan, Bihar, Orissa, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Madhya
Pradesh). Changes in district boundaries have been accounted for by consolidating new districts into their
parent districts. I restrict the sample to the 257 districts whose measured altitude is less than 600 meters.
The wage data were compiled by Robert E. Evenson and James W. McKinsey, Jr., using data from the
Directorate of Economics and Statistics within the Indian Ministry of Agriculture. Each state is responsible for
collecting monthly data on the male and female wage (cash and in-kind) for several agricultural occupations,
by district, and submitting the data to the Directorate for inclusion in its annual Agricultural Wages in India
publication. The Directorate suggests that states use public servants such as patwaris (revenue oﬃcials),
primary school teachers, or panchayat (local council) members to collect the data.
Evenson and McKinsey constructed an annual measure of the male daily agricultural wage using weighted
monthly data. June and August were weighted more heavily because of the high intensity of ﬁeld work during
these months. Missing data prevented their using a single agricultural occupation throughout the series, so
their measure uses the wage for a male ploughman if available, then for a male ﬁeld laborer, and then for other
male agricultural labor.
Crop yield
Data on the volume produced and the area cropped, by crop, are from the World Bank data set. I construct the
variable log yield as the weighted average of log(volume of crop produced/area cropped) for the 5 major crops
by revenue which are rice, wheat, sugar, jowar (sorghum), and groundnut. The weights are the district-average
revenue share of the crop, and the yield for each crop has been normalized to mean 1 for comparability across
crops.
Rainfall
The rainfall data set, Terrestrial Air Temperature and Precipitation: Monthly and Annual Time Series (1950-
99), Version 1.02, was constructed by Cort J. Willmott and Kenji Matsuura at the Center for Climatic Research,
University of Delaware. The rainfall measure for a latitude-longitude node combines data from 20 nearby
weather stations using an interpolation algorithm based on the spherical version of Shepard’s distance-weighting
method. The distance between the geographic center of a district (as speciﬁed in the World Bank data set)
and the nearest grid point ranges from 1 to 59 km, with a mean of 20 km.
Fraction of Workforce in Agriculture
The fraction of the working population in agriculture is from the Indian District Data, 1961–1991 compiled by
Reeve Vanneman and Douglas Barnes. The original source is the decennial Census of India. Data are linearly
extrapolated between Census years.
Crop price
Data on crop prices, by crop, are from the World Bank data set. I construct the variable log crop price as
the weighted average of the log price for the 5 major crops by revenue which are rice, wheat, sugar, jowar
(sorghum), and groundnut. The weights are the district-average revenue share of the crop, and the price for
each crop has been normalized to mean 1 for comparability across crops.
Banking
Average deposits and credit per capita are from the Indian district data set. Data on bank branches are from
the Reserve Bank of India.
27Access to other areas
Data on roads are from the World Bank data set. Data on railways and buses are from the 1981 Census. I
constructed distance to the nearest city using the latitude and longitude of districts from the World Bank data
set, the location of cities from the World Gazetteer (www.world-gazetteer.com), and data from the 1981 Census
on population by city.
Poverty
Poverty measures are from the National Sample Survey, Round 43. This is the earliest round of NSS data in
which it is possible to identify a respondent’s district. The measures are constructed from expenditure data
for households whose head of household works in agriculture.
Land distribution
Data on landlessness are from the Indian District data set. The Census categorizes agricultural workers as
either laborers or cultivators, deﬁning an agricultural laborer as “a person who worked in another person’s
land for wages in cash, kind or share...Such a person had no risk in cultivation but merely worked in another
person’s land for wages. An agricultural laborer had no right of lease or contract on land on which he worked.”
The fraction landless is the number of laborers divided by the sum of laborers and cultivators.
Data on the number of landowners in ﬁve size categories (<1 hectare (ha), 1-2 ha, 2-4 ha, 4-10 ha, and >10
ha) are from the 1981 Agricultural Census. The Gini coeﬃcient among landowners is constructed by assuming
that plot size is distributed uniformly within each category and that the maximum size is 30 ha.
Individual-level labor supply and migration
The individual-level data on labor supply and migration are from the International Crops Research Institute
for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) village-level study. ICRISAT surveyors were present and conducting
interviews continuously in each village, resulting in each household being observed approximately every 3
weeks. See Walker and Ryan (1990) for a detailed description of the survey. The villages in the labor supply
sample are Aurepalle, Shirapur, and Kanzara, and the villages in the migration sample are Aurepalle, Dokur,
Shirapur, Kalman, Kanzara, Kinkheda, Boriya Becharji, Rampura, Rampura Kalan, and Papda.
Landless households are deﬁned as those with less than 0.2 hectares (ha) of land who hired themselves out
as laborers as their main occupation and source of income. Ten landless households per village were randomly
sampled. In each village, landowners with more than 0.2 ha were divided into three equally-sized strata, and
10 households were sampled per stratum per village. In the median village, small landowners are those with ¡3
ha and medium landowners are those with ¡6 ha.
28Mathematical Appendix26
Solution of the Model
The Lagrangian of the model presented in Section II of the paper is




+ µ2 [l − 0] + µ3 [c1 − c] + µ4 [c2 − c]
+λ
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µ2l = 0 (vi)
µ3 [c1 − c] = 0 (vii)
µ4 [c2 − c] = 0 (viii)










1 + 1c2<y (r + φ) + 1c2>y (r − φ)
− c





π + wh +
y − c
1 + 1c2<y (r + φ) + 1c2>y (r − φ)
− c





π + wh − c

(1 + 1c2<y (r + φ) + 1c2>y (r − φ)) + y − c

A requirement for the solution to be valid is that the subsistence level of consumption is reached in each
period. From (L) to (C2), this is equivalent to requiring
wj (Aj)h + πi (Aj) +
yi − c
1 + 1c2,i<yi (r + φ) + 1c2,i>yi (r − φ)
− c > 0 for i ∈ {p,r}.
where landless agents are denoted by i = p and landowners by i = r. Since πp (Aj) = 0 for j ∈ {H,L}, if
yr ≥ yp, a suﬃcient condition for subsistence consumption to be reached is
yp − c
1 + 1c2,p<yp (r + φ) + 1c2,p>yp (r − φ)
− c > 0 (4)
26A supplemental appendix with additional derivations and proofs is available from the author upon request.
29which covers even the limit case where wj −→ 0+.
Labor Market Equilibrium
We are interested in analyzing an economy that exhibits aggregate borrowing (savings) in the face of a bad
(good) shock. We require
(1 − θ)(c2,r (Aj) − yr) + θ(c2,p (Aj) − yp) ≡ (1 − θ)c2,r (Aj) + θc2,p (Aj) − y
to be negative (positive) for j = L (j = H) where y = (1 − θ)yr + θyp is the economy-wide, period-2, windfall
income:
(1 − θ)(c2,r (AL) − c − yr) + θ(c2,p (AL) − c − yp) < c (5)
(1 − θ)(c2,r (AH) − c − yr) + θ(c2,p (AH) − c − yp) > c (6)






, and the village has total land K and landowners have
equally sized plots of land, kr = K
(1−θ)N. Therefore, total labor demand in this economy, at a wage rate w, is
given by
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(1 − θ)πr (Aj) +
y − c
1 + 1j=H (r − φ) + 1j=L (r + φ)
− c

Since the landowners’ individual proﬁts are given by




















































< 0 : j ∈ {L,H} (9)











(1 + r + φ) < y + 2αbc ⇐⇒
 
wLh + (1 − θ)πr,L

(1 + r + φ) <
y



























whereas, in the good state j = H, (A.3) becomes
 
wHh + (1 − θ)πr,H

(1 + r − φ) <
y
αb

































(1 + r − φ)h
(A.60)
In general, we would have yi be increasing in the landholdings ki for i ∈ {p,r}, or yr > yp. Yet, if
yr = yp = y, a suﬃcient condition for the required macroeconomic behavior of aggregate savings/borrowing is
for the landowners (landless) to be borrowing (saving) during a bad (good) productivity shock.
Proposition 1
The wage elasticity is increasing in poverty, where poverty is parameterized by the ratio of the subsistence level
to average TFP (
c
A); for ﬁxed A, ∂ν
∂c > 0.




∂c > 0 for ﬁxed AH,AL. Taking derivatives of (A.5) with respect to c we
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1 + r + φ
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From (A.6), it is now immediate that ∂wH
∂c , ∂wL
∂c < 0.


































31Using (A.4), though, we get





































































































wH > wL (A.10)























































































































































wH − wL −
(1 + r)(wH − wL) − φ(wH + wL)













πr,H − πr,L −
(1 + r)(πr,H − πr,L) − φ(πr,H + πr,L)
(1 + r + φ)(1 + r − φ)

.
This is positive for πr,H > πr,L since r > φ > 0.
32Proposition 2
The wage elasticity is increasing in banking costs, or ∂ν
∂φ > 0.




∂φ > 0. Diﬀerentiate the labor market equilibrium equation (A.5) with




































































(1 + r + φ)
2
Since y > c and (A.6), we get ∂wH
∂φ > 0 and ∂wL
∂φ < 0. The result is immediate.
Proposition 3(i)
An increase in the banking fee of the landless can make a landowner better oﬀ in expectation. That is, if φ = φp
for ki = 0, then ∃ parameter values such that ∂EUr
∂φp > 0.
For any state j ∈ {H,L}, the optimality conditions now give
c2,r − c
c1,r − c






The equilibrium utility of a landowner is given by
























+blog(b(1 + 1j=L (r + φr) + 1j=H (r − φr)))
A change in the banking costs for the landless φp, aﬀects the utility of the landowners only through its aﬀect
































































































































































































∂φp > 0 and ∂wL
∂φp < 0.
















































From (L), it is straightforward to check the following
wj
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which, using the labor market equilibrium equation (A.8), becomes
wj
 






1−β − θ 1−α
1+αb











For j = L, (A.12) implies that φr ≤ φp suﬃces for the second term on the right hand side of (A.10) to be
positive27For the ﬁrst term on the right hand side of (A.10), notice that (A.8), for j = H, implies that the
27More precisely, (A.12) implies that the term multiplying
∂wL





wH is bounded above:
πr,H
wH






















1 + r − φp
+
(1 − θ)(yr − c)

















By (A.4), the quantity
πr,H
wH is proportional to AH
wH . For a suﬃciently large productivity shock, AH −→ ∞,
πr,H
wH
remaining bounded from above requires that AH
wH remain bounded above; hence, it must be that wH −→ ∞.
Notice also from (A.9) that ∂wH
∂φp is bounded above whereas, by (L), lr,H tends to a ﬁnite limit. Therefore, for
AH −→ ∞, the ﬁrst term on the right hand side of (A.10) vanishes.
Proposition 3(ii)
An increase in the economy-wide cost of borrowing can make a landowner better oﬀ. That is, if all agents face
the banking cost φ, then ∃ parameter values such that ∂Ur
∂φ > 0 in the state e A = AL.
For j = L, the optimality conditions become
c2 − c
c1 − c






The equilibrium utility of a member of the land-owning class is given by

























+ blog(b(1 + r + φ))
It suﬃces to show that there is a range of the parameters of the model such that ∂

























































































(1 + r + φ)
2 +
b
1 + r + φ
35where the last equality uses (A.6). In the proof to Proposition 1 we showed, however, that
y − c








































































































































Recall, however, that ∂wL
∂φ < 0.28 Hence, for ∂

















































wLh + πr,L +
y − c
1 + r + φ
− c















































2 − (1 − α)
2




+ 2α(1 − b)
(1 + αb)(1 − α)
< 0
28See the proof to Proposition 2.






























































Therefore, for large enough θ, there exists a non-empty set of values for the parameters of the model such that
all terms on the right-hand side of (A.13) are positive.
Recall now (A.4) and (A.6): when wL is falling, πr,L is rising with limwL−→0 πr,L = +∞. Hence, a
suﬃciently low equilibrium wage wL guarantees that (A.13) holds for the aforementioned range of parameters.
The following claim guarantees that a falling equilibrium wage is not inconsistent with large values for the
parameter θ. This completes the proof.
Solution with Migration
The subsequent analysis allows migration to take place in the low-TFP state (j = L). We continue to assume
that, in this state, agents borrow against their period-2 income (or are, at most, indiﬀerent between borrowing
or not). Notice ﬁrst that one would never choose to migrate and not work. If li = h, one is better oﬀ not
incurring the costs of migration. Thus, we restrict attention to the interior solutions (li < h).
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y − c








π − e ∆ + Wh +
y − c








π − e ∆ + Wh − c

(1 + r + φ) + y − c
i
Let the equilibrium be such that a fraction λi ∈ (0,1) of the members of group i ∈ {p,r} choose to migrate.
Let it also be that everyone in the economy is working (li,lM
i < h : i ∈ {p,r}). The solution is given by (L),
(C1) and (C2) for those members of the ith group who do not migrate and by (ML), (MC1) and (MC2) for
























= (1 − λp)θ[wLH − wLNlp,L] + (1 − λr)(1 − θ)[wLH − wLNlr,L]
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− c
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In equilibrium, the fraction λi who migrate from the ith group is determined endogenously: there must exist a
draw of the random migration costs e ∆ that makes an agent indiﬀerent between migrating and not. Let ∆i be






Note that everyone in group i with migration costs below the threshold ∆i would choose to migrate, in
equilibrium, whereas everyone with costs above ∆i would stay home. The condition determining the cut-oﬀ
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Wh + πi − ∆i +
y−c
1+r+φ − c












Notice a direct implication given that (A.16) holds for both i = r and i = p:
Wh + πr − ∆r +
y−c
1+r+φ − c











Since a sine qua non for any migration in group i ∈ {p,r} to take place is W > wL, we get moreover
log
 
Wh + πi − ∆i +
y−c
1+r+φ − c
















(W − wL)h > ∆i i ∈ {p,r} (A.21)
Proposition 4(i)
The wage elasticity is increasing in migration costs, or ∂ν
∂ψ > 0.




∂∆max > 0 where ∆max ≡ ∆min + ψ. Consider ﬁrst diﬀerentiating the


















































































































which, by (A.7), can be also written as follows






































The rate of change of λi with respect to ∆max is given by
∂λi
∂∆max
= −(∆max − ∆min)
−2









2 + (∆max − ∆min)
−1 ∂∆i
∂∆max
Step I: It is instructive for the exposition of the proof to ignore for the moment the eﬀects of a change in ∆max








Notice ﬁrst that, from (A.15), we get





























where the ﬁrst inequality follows from λp > λr.29 The part of the right hand side of (A.19) which represents
29The result that λp > λr is an immediate corollary of Proposition 4(ii).











































where the ﬁrst inequality follows from ∆p > ∆r (Proposition 4(ii))which is proved below) and the second one
from lp < lr.30 In other words, the part of the right hand side of (A.19) which represents the direct eﬀects is
negative.















Consider now the condition determining the cut-oﬀ migration costs for group i ∈ {p,r}. Diﬀerentiating with















































































































U (li,c1,i,c2,i;∆i,M = 0)































































































Now, (A.11) and (A.6) allow us to rewrite the equality above as follows
 












Wh + πi − ∆i +
y − c









wLh + πi +
y − c





Therefore, the part of the right hand side of (A.19) representing the indirect eﬀects can be written as
(∆max − ∆min)

































































or, equivalently, as [wL (∆max − ∆min)]
−1 ∂wL/∂∆max multiplying the following quantity
















































(W − wL)h − ∆i =

Wh + πi − ∆i +
y − c





wLh + πi +
y − c




for i ∈ {p,r}. Hence, using also (A.17), we get
(W − wL)h − ∆i




Wh + πr − ∆r +
y−c
1+r+φ − c























































A fundamental property of Cobb-Douglas production is that aggregate proﬁts must be equal to aggregate labor



























































Since we are assuming an interior solution (li,L < h for i ∈ {p,r}), the last two terms in Υ are negative. (The
subscript L denotes the state e A = AL.) For the ﬁrst term, notice that
























where the inequality follows from λp > λr, θ ∈ (0,1) and our assumption of an interior solution for i = p.








































































































































where the second inequality uses the fact that lr > lp.
Step III: Consider (A.19) again and move the part of its right-hand side representing the indirect eﬀects on the
λi’s to the left-hand side. What will remain now on the right consists only of the quantity giving the direct

































By Step I, the right-hand side is now negative; on the left, the quantity in the brackets multiplying ∂wL/∂∆max
is positive. Hence, ∂wL/∂∆max < 0.
Notice that both the direct and indirect eﬀects seem to operate here in a similar manner in the sense that




= G : Z > 0,G < 0
The quantity G is the same in both cases. The quantity Z, however, gets larger when one includes the indirect
eﬀects. In other words, taking into account the oﬀsetting indirect eﬀects results in ∂wL
∂∆max remaining negative
but becoming smaller in magnitude.
Proposition 4(ii)
The landless have a higher propensity to move than landowners, or ∆p > ∆r.
44In equation (A.16), deﬁne
X = Wh +
y − c
1 + r + φ
− c and x = wLh +
y − c
1 + r + φ
− c
to get





=⇒ x(πr − ∆r) = Xπr − ∆p (x + πr) =⇒
(X − x − ∆p)πr = x(∆p − ∆r) =⇒ ∆p − ∆r =





where the inequality results from applying (A.18) to the landless group. Thus ∆p > ∆r.
By deﬁnition, ∆r < ∆p is equivalent to λr < λp. Since θ,λi ∈ (0,1) for i ∈ {p,r}, it follows that
1 − λr − θ(λp − λr) > (1 − θ)(λp − λr) > 0











The wage elasticity is decreasing in the proportion of individuals who are landless, or ∂ν
∂θ < 0.



















































1 + r + φ
− c

32Note that aggregate proﬁts




















are independent of θ for j ∈ {H,L}.
45or, using (A.6) and (A.11),

















































































































































































































































































































= (∆max − ∆min)
−1 ∂∆i
∂θ
for i ∈ {p,r}

























which is equal to −(∆max − ∆min)



















































































































(W − wL)h − ∆r















(W − wL)h − ∆r





Hence, (A.22) can be written as follows











































(W − wL)h − ∆r




















































(W − wL)h − ∆r
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(W − wL)h − ∆r






Recall that in the proof to Proposition 4(ii), we derived the following relation
∆p − ∆r =
 






































= (∆max − ∆min)
−1 wL (lr,L − lp,L)
 











































= (∆max − ∆min)
−1 wL (lr,L − lp,L)
 






Since both the right-hand side as well as the bracketed term on the left-hand side (multiplying ∂wL
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50Figure 1: Agricultural Wage Volatility Versus Gross Domestic Product
Notes
1. Wage volatility is calculated from Occupational Wages around the World (OWW) data (Freeman
and Oostendorp 2000). It is the standard deviation of log average monthly real wages for a male ﬁeld
crop farm worker, ﬁrst removing a country-speciﬁc linear trend. The log of annual real gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita (in 1996 US dollars) is from the Penn World Tables.
2. The sample consists of all countries for which farm-worker wage data are available for each
of 1988 to 1991. (AUT=Austria, BGD=Bangladesh, BEL=Belgium, BMU=Bermuda, BLZ=Belize,
CZE=Czechoslovakia, CYP=Cyprus, DZA=Algeria, IND=India, ITA=Italy, MMR=Myanmar, NZL=New
Zealand, USA=United States, ZMB= Zambia.) The OWW data set covers 1981-99; the 1988-91 pe-
riod yields the largest balanced panel with at least 4 years per country. The patterns are similar
using other subsamples.




Mean Std deviation N Source
Agricultural variables
Log agricultural wage 1.22 0.82 8222 World Bank
Log crop yield -0.06 0.29 8222 World Bank
Log crop price index -0.22 0.64 8222 World Bank
Rainfall
Proportional deviation from mean district rainfall 0.00 0.28 8222 University of Delaware
Annual rainfall (millimeters) 1057 551 8222 University of Delaware
Banking
Per capita deposits in 1981 (rupees 1000s/person) 0.25 0.26 7678 Census of India
Per capita credit in 1981 (rupees 1000s/person) 0.17 0.21 7614 Census of India
Bank branches/1000 people 0.04 0.05 8080 Reserve Bank of India
Access to other areas
Road density (km/km
2) 1.93 2.08 7965 World Bank
Proportion of villages with bus service in 1981 0.33 0.25 7838 Census of India
Proportion of villages with railway in 1981 0.02 0.02 7838 Census of India
Closeness to city (km
−1) 0.012 0.013 8222 Census of India
Poverty (among agricultural households)
Per capita expenditure (rupees/year) in 1987 33739 89244 8126 National Sample Survey
Proportion poor (expenditures < 14000 rupees/year) 0.51 0.16 8126 National Sample Survey
Land ownership
Proportion of agricultural workers who are landless 0.28 0.16 8222 Census of India 1961/71/81
Gini of land ownership (excluding landless) in 1981 0.53 0.05 7711 Agricultural Census 1981
Other variables
Area of district (km
2) 4633 2370 8222 World Bank
Proportion of workforce in agriculture in 1961 0.80 0.09 8222 Census of India
aThe data appendix describes how variables are deﬁned and constructed.
53Table 2
Relationship Between Agricultural Wage and Crop Yield, Instrumented with Rainfall
a
Model: OLS (1st stage) OLS IV




RainShock * % of workforce in agric. .003
(.005)
Log crop yield .035 *** .167 **
(.012) (.084)
Log crop yield * % of workforce in agric. -.009
(.039)
N 8222 8222 8222
Instruments RainShock,
RainShock * % in agric.
District and year ﬁxed eﬀects? Yes Yes Yes
aEach observation is a district-year. Standard errors, in parentheses below the coeﬃcients, allow for clustering within
a region-year. *** indicates p<.01, ** indicates p<.05, * indicates p<.10. RainShock = 1 if annual rainfall>district’s
80th percentile of rainfall, 0 if between the 20th and 80th percentiles, and -1 if below the 20th percentile. Log crop
yield is the weighted average log(volume of crop produced/area cropped) for the 5 major crops by revenue. Percent
of workforce in agriculture has been transformed to be mean 0, standard deviation 1. See the data appendix for data
sources and further detail.
54Table 3
Banking and the Elasticity of the Wage
a
Dependent variable: Log agricultural wage, 1956-1987
Measure of Banking
Bank deposits per capita Bank credit per capita Bank branches per capita
(1) (2) (3)




Log crop yield * Banking -.091 ** -.075 * -.033 *
(.036) (.044) (.019)
N 7678 7614 8080
District and year FE? Yes Yes Yes
Instruments = RainShock, RainShock * Banking, RainShock * % of workforce in agriculture
aStandard errors, which are in parentheses below the coeﬃcients, allow for clustering within region-years. ***
indicates p<.01, ** indicates p<.05, * indicates p<.10. Variables interacted with log crop yield have been transformed
to be mean 0, standard deviation 1. All regressions include as an endogenous control variable the % of workforce in
agriculture in 1961 interacted with log crop yield. The district ﬁxed eﬀect absorbs the level eﬀect of time-invariant
measures of banking. See the data appendix for data sources and further detail.
55Table 4
Access to Neighboring Areas and the Elasticity of the Wage
a
Dependent variable: Log agricultural wage, 1956-1987
Measure of Access to Neighboring Areas
Road density Bus service Railway Closeness to city
(km/km
2) (% of villages) (% of villages) (km
−1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log crop yield .133 * .147 * .162 ** .171 **
(.080) (.076) (.082) (.084)
Access -.026
(.020)
Log crop yield * Access -.111 -.095 ** -.098 * -.050
(.083) (.046) (.051) (.039)
N 7965 7838 7838 8222
District and year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instruments = RainShock, RainShock * Access, RainShock * % of workforce in agriculture
aStandard errors, in parentheses below the coeﬃcients, allow for clustering within region-years. *** indicates p<.01,
** indicates p<.05, * indicates p<.10. Variables interacted with RainShock have been transformed to be mean 0,
standard deviation 1. All regressions include as an endogenous control variable the % of workforce in agriculture
interacted with log crop yield. The district ﬁxed eﬀect absorbs the level eﬀect of time-invariant measures of access. See




Sample for analysis of labor supply (3 villages, 1975-1979)
Variable Mean Std. Dev
Monsoon rainfall (July and August) in meters 0.34 0.16
Proportion who are landless 0.15 0.35
Proportion who are small landowners 0.16 0.37
Proportion who are medium landowners 0.29 0.45
Proportion who are large landowners 0.40 0.49
Log hours worked in agriculture/day 1.80 0.46
Male adults per household 1.91 1.28
Sample for analysis of migration (10 villages, 1975-1984)
Variable Mean Std. Dev
Monsoon rainfall (July and August) in meters 0.36 0.24
Proportion who are landless 0.22 0.41
Proportion who are small landowners 0.21 0.41
Proportion who are medium landowners 0.24 0.43
Proportion who are large landowners 0.32 0.47
Individual has temporarily migrated for work 0.04 0.19
Male adults per household 2.13 1.16
aThe sample for the labor supply estimates are adult family males who supply labor in the home village (N=2603
person-months), and for the migration estimates, all adult males (N=1784 person-months). Each observation is an
individual-month. In each village 10 landless households and 10 households from each tercile of the village-speciﬁc land
distribution were sampled. Small, medium, and large landowners denote these terciles. Source: International Crops
Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) Village-Level Survey, India.
57Table 6
Labor Supply Elasticity and Migration by Land Ownership
a
Dependent variable
Log hours worked in agriculture/day Has migrated temporarily for work
(OLS) (Probit)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RainShock .527 *** .620 *** .007 -.002
(.149) (.237) (.009) (.011)
Landless .306 *** .397 *** .037 ** .029 *
(.106) (.131) (.028) (.027)
Small landholding .291 *** -.019 *
(.102) (.008)
Medium landholding .095 .011
(.101) (.013)
RainShock * Landless -.295 -.369 -.046 ** -.027
(.223) (.288) (.020) (.018)
RainShock * Small Land -.382 .049 *
(.243) (.025)
RainShock * Medium Land -.048 .005
(.239) (.013)
N 2603 2603 1784 1784
Village, year, and month FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
aStandard errors are in parentheses below the coeﬃcients and are adjusted for clustering within a household. ***
indicates p<.01, ** indicates p<.05, * indicates p<.10. Each observation is an individual-month. Adults are deﬁned
as 18-60 year olds. RainShock = rainfall in meters for July and August. Small, medium, and large landholdings are
the terciles of the village’s land distribution. Number of working male adults in the household and its interaction with
RainShock are included as controls. The reported probit coeﬃcients are marginal eﬀects. Source: ICRISAT.
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